Judith Butler
Gender Trouble (1990)
Chapter 2 "Prohibition, Psychoanalysis, and the Production of the Heterosexual Matrix"
III Freud and the melancholia of gender
IV Gender complexity and the limit of identification
[Summary]
FreudのMelancholy論を参照して、自我の形成（とりわけジェンダーの形成）を失われた愛の対象の内面化から捉える。社会的に「喪失を嘆くことができない」ことが運命づけられている、同性愛タブーによって禁じられた愛の対象（具体的には同性の親）を内面化することによって人間はジェンダー・アイデンティティを獲得する。この過程においては性目標（aim：欲望がどの性に向かうかというgeneralな方向性）と性対象（object：個別具体的な欲望の対象）の両方が否定され、「わたしはそれを愛したことはない、従って喪失したこともない」という二重の否認が行われ、その代償として対象との同一化が行われる。
☆Freud's "Mourning and Melancholia" and The Ego and Id
●["Mourning and Melancholia" summary]: In the experience of losing another human being whom one has loved, Freud argues, the ego is said to incorporate that other into the very structure of the ego, taking on attributes of the other and "sustaining" the other through magical acts of imitation. The loss of the other whom one desires and loves is overcome through a specific act of identification that seeks to harbor that other within the very structure of the self: "So by taking flight into the ego, love escapes annihilation" (MM 178). This identification is not simply momentary or occasional, but becomes a new structure of identity; in effect, the other becomes part of the ego through the permanent internalization of the other's attributes. In cases in which an ambivalent relationship is severed through loss, that ambivalence becomes internalized as a self-critical or self-debasing disposition in which the role of the other is now occupied and directed by the ego itself: "The narcissistic identification with the object then becomes a substitute for the erotic cathexis, the result of which is that in spite of the conflict with the loved person the love-relation need not be given up" (MM 170) (78).
●The melancholic refuses the loss of the object, and internalization becomes a strategy of magically resuscitating the lost object, not only because the loss is painful, but because the ambivalence felt toward the object requires that the object be retained until differences are settled (83-84).
●［The Ego and the Idにおける変化：mourningとmelancholiaの差を取払い、melancholic identificationをmourningの必要条件とする］Freud revises this distinction between mourning and melancholia and suggests that the identification process associated with melancholia may be "the sole condition under which the id can give up its objects" (EI 19). In other words, the identification with lost loves characteristic of melancholia becomes the precondition for the work of mourning. The two processes, originally conceived as oppositional, are now understood as integrally related aspects of the grieving process (84).
★このあたりは"Melancholy Gender/ Refused Identification"とほぼ同じ論。Melancholic identificationをgrievingの基盤に据えるようになるFreudに対する注目。
☆禁じられた同性愛の対象の保存としての肉体：Gender Identityを空間的比喩で捉える
●The ego ideal thus serves as an interior agency of sanction and taboo which, according to Freud, works to consolidate gender identity through the appropriate rechanneling and sublimation of desire. The internalization of the parent as object of love suffers a necessary inversion of meaning. The parent is not only prohibited as an object of love, but is internalized as a prohibiting or withholding object of love. The prohibitive function of the ego ideal thus works to inhibit or, indeed, repress the expression of desire for that parent, but also founds an interior "space" in which that love can be preserved (85).
●The debate over the meaning or subversive possibilities of identifications so far has left unclear exactly where those identifications are to be found. The interior psychic space in which identifications are said to be preserved makes sense only if we can understand that interior space as a phantasized locale that serves yet another psychic function. In agreement with Nicholas Abraham and Maria Torok it seems, psychoanalyst Roy Schafer argues that "incorporation" is a fantasy and not a process; the interior space into which an object is taken is imagined, and imagined within a language that can conjure and reify such spaces. If the identifications sustained through melancholy are "incorporated," then the question remains: Where is this incorporated space? If it is not literally within the body, perhaps it is on the body as its surface signification such that the body must itself be understood as an incorporated space (91-92).
●Consider that the refusal of the homosexual cathexis, desire and aim together, a refusal both compelled by social taboo and appropriated through developmental stages, results in a melancholic structure which effectively encloses that aim and object within the corporeal space or "crypt" established through an abiding denial. If the heterosexual denial of homosexuality results in melancholia and if melancholia operates through incorporation, then the disavowed homosexual love is preserved through the cultivation of an oppositionally defined gender identity. In other words, disavowed male homosexual love culminates in a heightened or consolidated masculinity, one which maintains the feminine as the unthinkable and unnameable.
●If gender differentiation follows upon the incest taboo and the prior taboo on homosexuality, then "becoming" a gender is a laborious process of becoming naturalized, which requires a differentiation of bodily pleasures and parts on the basis of gendered meanings. Pleasure are said to reside in the penis, the vagina, and the breasts or to emanate from them, but such descriptions correspond to a body which has already been constructed or naturalized as gender-specific. In other words, some parts of the body become conceivable foci of pleasure precisely because they correspond to a normative ideal of a gender-specific body (95).
●The conflation of desire with the real--that is, the belief that it is parts of the body, the "literal" penis, the "literal" vagina, which cause pleasure and desire--is precisely the kind of literalizing fantasy characteristic of the syndrome of melancholic heterosexuality. The disavowed homosexuality at the base of melancholic heterosexuality reemerges as the self-evident anatomical facticity of sex, where "sex" designates the blurred unity of anatomy, "natural identity," and "natural desire" (96-97).
★否認された同性愛欲望が異性愛の基盤にはあるという主張。同性愛欲望の否認→欲望対象のincorporation→体内化とはすなわち身体そのものを変化させることである→ジェンダー・アイデンティティ（「男らしさ」「女らしさ」）の獲得、さらに重要なことに性別化された身体の獲得（penisやvaginaを性感帯として作り上げる）。「身体の自然化」に抗うButlerの代表的身振り。
☆AbrahamとTrok、melancholyと喪の差異化、再び。Melancholyと意味付けの拒否。
●Abraham and Torok have argued that introjection is a process that serves the work of mourning (where the object is not only lost, but acknowledged as lost). Incorporation, on the other hand, belongs more properly to melancholy, the state of disavowed or suspended grief in which the object is magically sustained "in the body" in some way. Abraham and Torok suggest that introjection of the loss characteristic of mourning establishes an empty space, literalized by the empty mouth which becomes the confition of speech and signification. The successful displacement of the libido from the lost object is achieved through the formation of words which both signify and displace that object; this displacement from the original object is an essentially metaphorical activity in which words "figure" the absence and surpass it. Introjection is understood to be the work of mourning, but incorporation, which denotes a magical resolution of loss., characterizes melancholy. Whereas introjection founds the possibility of metaphorical signification, incorporation is antimetaphorical precisely because it maintains the loss as radically unnameable; in other words, incorporation is not only a failure to name or avow the loss, but erodes the conditions of metaphorical signification itself (92).
●[T]he loss of the maternal body as an object of love is understood to establish the empty space out of which words originate. But the refusal of this loss--melancholy--results in the failure to displace into words; indeed, the place of the maternal body is established in the body, "encrypted," to use their term, and given permanent residence there as a dead and deadning part of the body or one inhibited or possessed by phantasms of various kinds (93).
●When we consider gender identity as melancholic structure, it makes sense to choose "incorporation" as the manner by which that identification is accomplished. Indeed, according to the scheme above, gender identity would be established through a refusal of loss that encrypts itself in the body and that determines, in effect, the living versus the dead body. As an antimetaphorical activity, incorporation literalizes the loss or in the body and so appears as the facticity of the body, the means by which the body comes to bear "sex" as its literal truth. The localization and/or prohibition of pleasures and desires in given "erotogenic" zones is precisely the kind of gender-differentiating melancholy that suffuses the body's surface (93).
★かなりはっきりとKristevaとの相同性が見られる議論。ラカン派だから当たり前なのだけれど。Melancholyは言語による意味付け（言語による欲望対象のdisplacement）を拒否する。喪失をunnameableなものとして保存する。つまり喪失された対象自身に自らがなる。Unnameableという言葉が出てくる瞬間。これは必ず使う。
☆始源の欲望は幻想に過ぎない（Foucault）
●What precisely does it mean to reverse Freud's causal narrative and to think of primary dispositions as effects of the law? In the first volume of The History of Sexuality, Foucault criticizes the repressive hypothesis for the presumption of an original desire (not "desire" in Lacan's term, but jouissance) that maintains ontological integrity and temporal proproty with respect to the repressive law. This law, according to Foucault, subsequently silences or transmutes that desire into a secondary and inevitably dissatisfying form or expression (displacement). Foucault argues that desire which is conceived as both original and repressed is the effect of the subjugating law itself. In consequence, the law produces the conceit of the repressed desire int order to rationalize its own self-amplyfing strategies, and, rather than exercise a repressive function, the juridical law, here as elsewhere, ought to be reconceived as a discursive practice which is productive or generative--discursive in that it produces the linguistic fiction of repressed desire in order to maintain tis own position as a teleological instrument (88).
★この議論自体はFoucault-Butlerの根幹にあるものとして理解できるのだけど、どうもよくわからないのは、たとえばButlerが異性愛をメランコリックな同性愛否認＝incorporationの産物として捉えるとき、同性愛タブーと同性の親に対する欲望を始源のものとしては据えていないのか、ということなんだよね…
